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Understanding	  fixation	  effects	  in	  
creativity:	  A	  design-­theory	  approach 
 
Despite the existence of many studies about the different aspects of fixation in 
creativity and design reasoning, the underlying mechanisms of fixation, i.e., the 
processes that interfere during creative reasoning and lead one to become fixated 
on a small number of unvaried solutions, remain unclear. In this paper, we 
propose a theoretical framework to model fixation based on C-K design theory, 
which states that fixation is characterised as a set of restrictive heuristics 
activated in creative reasoning. We applied our framework in a set of experiments. 
We demonstrated how this framework makes sense of the varieties of fixation in 
design processes. We conclude by proposing three capabilities to understand 
fixation and overcome it: restrictive heuristics development, inhibitory control and 
expansion.  
Keywords: fixation effects, design theory, design cognition 
 
 
Today, there are great expectations for innovation and creativity. However, 
generating and developing new ideas is not as easy as it seems. The process of 
creating innovative ideas can become stale (Agogué, Le Masson & Robinson 
2012), as past investments (Arthur 1989; David 1985) and cognitive frames 
(Thrane et al. 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas 2008) can lock creative efforts into a 
specific design path, preventing other possibilities from emerging. The idea of 
cognitive bias in innovation and creative settings agrees with what the literature 
on strategy has described (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) as a set of heuristic rules, 
norms and cognitive representations that guide paths of action while exploring 
new opportunities for development. More precisely, in the field of design, 
studies have highlighted how people are likely to face cognitive difficulties in 
creative situations. Jansson and Smith (1991) demonstrated that the solution 
explored first in a design task heavily influences the exploration of new 
solutions. This phenomenon is known as the fixation effect, i.e., “a blind, 
  
sometimes counterproductive, adherence to a limited set of ideas in the design 
process” (ibid.). If design literature builds on this notion of fixation in design 
processes (Purcell & Gero, 1996; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Perttula & 
Liikanen, 2006; Linsey et al, 2010) or even proposes practical methodologies to 
overcome fixation effects (Van der Vlugt & Wiering, 2002; Linsey et al. 2009; 
Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2011), the nature of the very mechanisms that 
lead people to remain fixed on certain ideas or solutions still needs to be 
explored. If other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, are applied to the 
concept of the fixation effect, its modelling still remains vague, as fixation is 
mostly described as the spontaneous and unconscious activation of knowledge to 
find ways of solving a given design task (Smith et al, 1995).   
Despite the range of diverse studies about the different aspects of fixation in 
creativity and design reasoning, the underlying mechanisms of fixation, i.e., the 
processes that interfere during creative reasoning and lead to one become fixated 
on a small number of unvaried solutions, are still unclear. Specifically, to model 
the fixation that occurs during design reasoning, one must more precisely 
understand the link between activated knowledge and the solutions that are 
consequently explored. This paper aims to examine the nature of fixation in 
creative contexts. We proposed a theoretical framework to model fixation based 
on C-K design theory. C-K theory models creative reasoning by separating two 
spaces, the knowledge space and the concept space, which takes into account the 
links between different knowledge bases and the possible design paths that can 
be explored using these pockets of knowledge. In this paper, we exposed a 
theoretical framework that allows us to characterise the nature of fixation 
mechanisms. We then used a creative task in which the aim was to design a way 
to drop a hen's egg from a height of 10 meters so that it does not break. We 
chose this task as it required minimal engineering expertise and allowed for 
many possible solutions. We applied our framework to this task to characterise 
the possible fixation effects, and we weighted this theoretical approach against a 
set of experiments in which 6 different populations (of various ages and levels of 
training) were given 10 minutes to generate as many solutions as possible to the 
creative ‘egg task’. We demonstrated how different populations can be fixed in 
different ways and how our proposed theoretical framework made sense of the 
varieties of fixation in design processes. We concluded by proposing three 
  
capabilities that are required to understand and overcome fixation: restrictive 
heuristics development, inhibitory control and expansion. 
 
1 Fixation effect, a cognitive phenomenon in 
design 
Many factors can influence creative design processes. In their seminal paper 
about obstacles during creative reasoning, Jansson and Smith (1991) showed that 
the solution explored first in a design task heavily influences the exploration of 
new solutions. This phenomenon is called the fixation effect and is defined as a 
tacit, unconscious fixation on a limited scope of ideas during a creative design 
process. Their study stressed how individual designers can be trapped by an 
existing (or an obvious) solution, which constrains the generation of alternative 
solutions. The fixation effect is described as being due to the existence of 
precedents in design situations, generally in the form of visual representations. 
Design literature builds on the notion of fixation in design processes in various 
settings. Using a complementary perspective, Purcell and Gero (1996) also 
explored cognitive bias in design situations. They showed how fixation and 
conformity effects can occur in design processes when individuals have to 
design new objects to accomplish specific functions. They specifically studied 
the link between fixation and domain-specific knowledge. Furthermore, the 
nature of the stimuli can induce fixation in various ways, as the stimuli can be 
problem-relevant information given to participants (Tseng, Moss, Cagan & 
Kotovsky, 2008), as well as non-verbal pictorial information (Cardoso, Badke-
Schaub & Luz, 2009). It has also been argued that fixation strongly relates to a 
sunk cost effect, i.e., the reluctance to change a path of action once significant 
resources have been invested in a specific path (Viswanathan & Linsey, 2011). 
Moreover, several authors have proposed practical methodologies to overcome 
fixation effects, ranging from design methodologies (Hatchuel, Le Masson, & 
Weil, 2011) to the use of analogies (Linsey et al. 2009; Smith, Linsey & Kerne, 
2010) or expansive examples (Agogué et al. 2011). For instance, Youmans 
(2010) argued that physical prototyping in design was a key element for 
avoiding fixation, as prototyping is argued to reduce the cognitive demands of a 
design process, hence easing editing processes that identify and eliminate 
  
fixation effects. In another study, Youmans also showed how brief interruptions 
during the design process help to reduce fixation (Youmans, 2011). This is 
known as the incubation effect and was also described by Dodds, Smith & Ward 
(2002).  
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, no model of fixation has been proposed, except 
in the work by Dong and Sarkar (2011) in which they built on the interpretation 
of fixation as an inappropriate interpretation of a given problem due to the 
difficulty of building a meta-representation. They proposed a mathematical 
model of fixation occurring at a meta-representation level. However, such a 
model accounts for fixation in problem-solving situations as a lack of flexibility 
in terms of representations (for example, the difficulty of using common objects 
in ways that are unexpected and novel) but does not rely on fixation in purely 
idea generation phases.     
Disciplines other than design have examined the impact of cognitive bias on 
reasoning. Because fixation appears as a cognitive mechanism, it is not 
surprising that cognitive science has taken an interest in such an issue. 
Expanding to this discipline is all the more interesting, as bridging engineering 
design and cognitive psychology literature has proven its ability to describe the 
mechanisms that operate during creative design processes (Howard, Culley & 
Dekoninck, 2008). In the field of cognitive psychology, scholars have clarified 
the obstacles that most people are likely to face in creative situations (Smith, 
Ward & Finke, 1995; Abrahamm & Windman, 2007; Kohn & Smith, 2010). 
Scholars have shown how recently activated knowledge can constrain the ability 
to generate creative ideas. For example, creative problem solving can be 
inefficient when the solution requires subjects to generate an atypical object 
function and when the object’s typical function has been primed (Duncker, 
1945; Adamson, 1952). In psychology, this effect is labelled as functional 
fixedness. Other studies (Smith et al., 1995) have highlighted how the first ideas 
to be considered during creative idea generation can constrain the ideas that are 
subsequently generated. Furthermore, studies have shown how different 
populations can be affected in different ways by this fixedness. Deyfeter and 
German (2001) showed how young children are not affected by functional 
fixedness in the same way that older children are affected. In a different setting, 
Bonnardel and Marmèche (2004) underlined how experts can be more biased 
  
than novices in design situations, which is in agreement with studies about the 
impact of domain-related knowledge on creative idea generation (Wiley, 1998).  
When integrating the different elements from existing work in engineering 
design and cognitive psychology, some questions arise when trying to more 
thoroughly understand fixation. These questions are as follows: what is the true 
nature of fixation? How can some activated knowledge constrain a design 
process? Can a model of fixation help to understand ways to unfix to overcome 
fixation? 
 
2 A design theory –driven theoretical 
framework to model fixation 
We propose to use a design theory approach to study fixation, as such theories 
aim to model creative reasoning, which offers a framework through which to 
study obstacles that can occur during such design process. We selected C-K 
theory because it offers a modelling of creative reasoning by separating two 
spaces, the knowledge space and the concept space, which helps to account for 
the links between knowledge bases and the possible design paths that can be 
explored using these pockets of knowledge. 
 
2.1 Foundations of C-K theory 
C-K design theory (Hatchuel & Weil, 2003; 2007; 2009; Le Masson, Weil & 
Hatchuel, 2010) defines design reasoning as a logic of expansion processes, 
which organises the generation of objects that are unknown, thus leading to a 
truly novel design regime. It is named “C-K theory” because its central 
proposition is a formal distinction between concepts and knowledge. C-K theory 
models the generative process as an interaction between two expandable spaces, 
a space of concepts and a space of knowledge. Exploration in the knowledge 
space (K-space) encompasses the mapping of the knowledge base necessary for 
understanding and having a successful design path. A concept (located in the C-
space) is defined as a proposition without a logical status in the K-Space, i.e., an 
undecidable proposition, which means it is impossible to say if a concept is true 
  
or false. The C-space is a tree of undecidable propositions, and each node of the 
tree corresponds to a partition (in the mathematical sense) in several sub-
concepts of the mother concept. C-K theory models the creative process as the 
interrelated expansion of two spaces. In other words, the C-space is tree-
structured and describes the progressive and stepwise generation of alternatives, 
which are generally undecidable propositions before a conjunction can be 
interpreted as a solution. The K-space is formed by the network of memorised 
and activated knowledge that is used for the generative process of C-space. 
Figure 1 summarises the basic features of C-K theory. 
 
 
Figure 1: Features of C-K theory: the expansion of two spaces 
 
2.2 Using C-K theory as a theoretical framework to 
model fixation effects 
C-K theory establishes the framework of a design process based on refining and 
expanding the initial concept by adding attributes stemming from the knowledge 
space. The initial concept-set is thus partitioned step-by-step in several 
increasingly more refined sub-concepts. There are, however, two types of 
partitions (Hatchuel & Weil, 2009; Hatchuel, Le Masson, & Weil, 2011). The 
restrictive partition is a partition that restricts the space of possibilities without 
changing the definition or the attributes of the object to design. However, 
sticking to restrictive partitions does not allow for the redefinition of objects. 
  
Hence, an expansive partition is a partition that modifies the identity of the 
initial design object by adding unexpected attributes to that of the initial concept. 
It is precisely because of those expansions that novelty, including surprises, is 
possible.  
Using the distinction between the restrictive partition and expansive partition, 
we propose the following model of a fixation effect: fixation is characterised as 
a set of restrictive heuristics activated in creative reasoning. We borrowed this 
notion of heuristics from cognitive psychology. A heuristic has to be understood 
as a set of simple, efficient rules that are learned or hard-coded by evolutionary 
processes, which allow for shortcuts to ease the cognitive load of reasoning. 
Thus, a restrictive heuristic is design reasoning that uses only spontaneously 
activated knowledge in the K space and restrictive partitions in the C space. Any 
expansion in the design reasoning, K space and/or C space leads to the 
exploration of solutions outside fixation, characterising expansive reasoning.  
 
Figure 2: Model of a fixation effect as a set of restrictive heuristics: a 
spontaneously activated knowledge base (light grey) will determine partitions in 
the C space (in white) and leads to the reduced exploration of possible solutions 
(the grey concepts will not be explored). 
It may be noted that this model emphasises the distinction between mobilised 
knowledge (the knowledge that a designer has at his disposal) and activated 
knowledge (the knowledge that spontaneously comes to mind while thinking of 
a design problem). The effects of fixation are intrinsically linked to the 
activation of some specific knowledge in design reasoning. This activation then 
  
induces the exploration of a small number of conceptual paths, leaving the paths 
that require expansion unexplored.  
 
3 Experimenting on fixation effect 
We expanded this theoretical framework of the fixation effect and analysed it 
with a set of experiments where six different populations (with various ages and 
training) were given ten minutes to generate as many solutions as possible to the 
creative ‘egg task’. In the first step, we used the proposed framework to explore 
possible paths of innovation, capturing the possible generation of new 
knowledge and objects about the matter of dropping an egg without breaking it. 
Thus, we characterised the emergence of restrictive heuristics, or in other words, 
the difficulty to expand in both C and K spaces. In the second step, we asked 
different populations to generate solutions to the egg task. After assessing the 
differences of fixation among the different populations, we showed how our 
theoretical framework made sense of this variety of fixation in the creative 
design process.  
 
3.1 Modelling a distribution of possible alternatives to 
a creative task 
To use C-K theory in our study, we first gathered the knowledge, expertise and 
solutions usually proposed for the creative ‘egg task’ (shells, mattresses, 
parachutes). Our hypothesis was that this knowledge basis is what is 
spontaneously activated while solving this task. We then expanded in the C-
space by showing the hidden partitions that had been made to achieve the design 
of devices that either changed the reception or the fall. The objective was to drop 
an egg from a 10-meter height without breaking it using a device that is inert 
(e.g., not living). The expansions, (a) without using a device and (b) using a 
living device, forced us to expand in the K-space and look for new knowledge 
(about egg properties, living devices etc.), which then allowed us to think of new 
expansions in the C-space (such as using the natural properties of the egg or 
modifying them). This allowed us to map the possible solutions axis and to think 
  
of possible solution paths that do not spontaneously come to mind (for example, 
training an eagle to catch the egg, using the natural robustness of the 
longitudinal axis of an egg and freezing the egg). In contrast, the restrictive 
heuristics do not require an expansion of knowledge or a concept that 
characterises the fixation effect, as the restrictive heuristics demonstrate 
damping the shock, protecting the egg and slowing the fall. The restrictive 
heuristics and expansions are shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: Modelling expansive and restrictive reasoning in the ‘egg task’. The 
knowledge and concepts in white represent restrictive reasoning, the knowledge 
and concept in dark represent expansive reasoning. Three restrictive heuristics 
appear: damping the shock, protecting the egg and slowing the fall. 
 
3.2 Participants and Procedure 
The current investigation included 142 participants. The sample was divided into 
five groups based on age and training. The composition of the groups is 
described in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Composition of the groups in the experiment 
Name of the group N  Age (mean) Training level 
Children 18 10.1 Elementary school 
Adolescents 30 14.6 High school 
Psychology students 28 18.8 Under-graduate 
Engineering students 33 22.5 Master students 
Entrepreneurs 17 23.5 Master students 
Designers 16 23 Master students 
 
Each participant was given ten minutes to individually generate and silently 
write down as many original solutions as possible to the following problem: 
“Ensure that a hen's egg dropped from a height of 10 meters does not break.” 
 
3.3 Results 
We used the categories of solutions deduced from the model of restrictive and 
expansive reasoning presented in figure 3 to analyse the distribution of answers. 
Every group appeared to be subject to a fixation effect, as the percentage of 
solutions on the three restrictive categories, “damping the shock”, “protecting 
the egg” and “slowing the fall”, were all between 63% and 81%. Figure 4 
presents the percentage of answers for each group and is focused on the three 
categories issued from restrictive heuristics.  
  
 
Figure 4: Results of the percentage of answers on each restrictive heuristic 
depending on the population. The percentages below the graph represent the total 
percentage of answers given within the three restrictive heuristics.  
 
This graph shows the variety of fixation effects depending on the studied 
population. Group comparisons were performed using Fisher exact tests. Three 
main points emerged:  
1. The evolution of fixation over age. Looking at the results of the first 
three categories, i.e., children (age 10), adolescents (age 15) and adults 
(psychology students, age 20), the nature of fixation evolved with age 
(see figure 5). Indeed, adults proposed a significantly smaller percentage 
of answers than adolescents in the category “damping the shock” (p < 
.005). For the category “protecting the egg”, adolescents proposed less 
answers than adults (p < .005) and children (p < .005). For “slowing the 
fall”, adults proposed a higher percentage of solutions than children (p < 
.01) and adolescents (p = .07). 
 
  
 
Figure 5: Evolution over age of the results of percentage of answers per 
restrictive category, using Fisher exact tests (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < 
.005) 
 
2. The different fixations between trainings. Looking at the last four 
population groups, our results showed that training and backgrounds 
have an impact on the nature of the fixation effect (see figure 6 below). 
Regarding the category “damping the shock”, undergraduates in 
psychology provided more answers (in percentage) than designers 
(p<.01) and entrepreneurs (p=.07), whereas engineering students tended 
to give more answers than designers (p=.08). Looking at the category 
“protecting the egg”, engineering students provided a lower percentage 
of answers than students in psychology (p<.05) and design (p=.06). The 
percentage response in the category “slowing the fall” was higher for 
engineers than among psychology students (p <.01) and designers (p 
<.05).  
 
  
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the results of the percentage of answers per restrictive 
category based on background and training, with Fisher’s exact test (*p <.05; 
**p<.01; ***p<.005) 
 
3. The expansion capabilities of designers. If we focus our analysis on 
the population of designers, it seemed that these individuals were better 
able than the other populations to generate solutions outside of the three 
restrictive reasoning (all p <.05, see figure 7 below).  
 
Figure 7: Expansion capabilities of different populations: % solutions 
using expansive reasoning  
 
  
 
4 Discussion 
In this paper, we showed how the use of design theory helps to broaden our 
understanding of the difficulties that occur in creative processes, namely fixation 
effects. We proposed to model fixation as a set of restrictive heuristics. We used 
a creative task to apply our theoretical framework to characterise fixation 
effects, and we examined this theoretical approach with a set of experiments in 
which participants of different ages and training were asked to generate solutions 
to a creative task. We then showed how different populations are fixed in 
different ways. 
Our results showed how the nature of the fixation effect evolves with age, as 
adolescents provided a smaller percentage of answers regarding “protecting the 
egg” than adults and children. A qualitative analysis of the answers of children 
and adults within this heuristic showed that solutions given by children and 
adults were quite different, as children proposed to wrap an egg with aluminium 
foil, which was a solution that no adult proposed. It seems that the structure of 
knowledge regarding protecting an egg evolves with age, impacting the 
activation of the heuristic on “protecting the egg”. Looking at the third category 
“slowing the fall”, it seems that the pocket of knowledge regarding “slowing the 
fall” was not spontaneously activated for children and adolescents. Discussions 
with ten year olds confirmed that children know what parachutes are and how 
they work. However, this knowledge did not easily or spontaneously come to 
mind. Applying the model of fixation using the C-K theory presented previously, 
we can make sense of this difference, as shown in figure 6 below. 
 
  
 
Figure 6: Modelling of the differences of fixation between children and adults 
using C-K driven framework: a spontaneously activated knowledge base (light 
grey) will determine expansions in the C space (in white) and lead to a reduced 
exploration of possible solutions (the grey concepts will not be explored) 
Moreover, our study showed that engineers and entrepreneurs seem to have 
more scientific knowledge regarding the ways to slow the fall than psychology 
students or designers, which leads to a more strongly activated heuristic on 
slowing the fall. The percentage response in the category “slowing the fall” was 
higher for engineers than among psychology students and designers. A 
qualitative analysis of the answers given by the engineers showed that the 
solutions they proposed for damping the shock and protecting the egg were very 
detailed and complex, potentially demonstrating that their knowledge on falls 
made them think that no shell or mattress would work if the fall was not slower. 
This study on the impact of training shows that designers have developed a 
strong capability to resist fixation, which can be interpreted as the development 
of expansive heuristics, contrasting with restrictive heuristics leading to fixation. 
Hence, the training in design schools might push individuals to develop 
spontaneous generative heuristics, leading to a greater ability to expand from the 
fixation effect.  
Our results regarding fixation through a developmental perspective and the 
differences due to trainings implied that the fixation mechanisms can be 
modelled as the development of restrictive heuristics. However, how can we 
then apprehend the mechanisms linked to overcoming fixation? We identified 
  
three capabilities that play a role in fixation and overcoming fixation, and they 
are as follows: 
1. Restrictive heuristics development depending on the knowledge structures, 
leading to restrictive reasoning. This mechanism is linked to the structuring of 
knowledge over time through development, education and training.   
2. Inhibitory capability (Houdé, 2000; Houdé & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003; 
Houdé et al, 2000) to resist restrictive heuristics and restrictive reasoning. This 
mechanism reflects the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of restrictive 
heuristics (i.e., reasoning leading to fixation) to privilege other types of 
reasoning. So far, inhibition has mostly been considered as a social process 
constraining creativity, as it is said that in a group, social pressure and 
conformity can push individuals to inhibit their creativity. In agreement with the 
proposal of Storm and Angello (2010), we proposed that inhibitory control is a 
way to think of something new, and easy solutions that quickly and 
unconsciously come to mind have to be inhibited to make space for generative 
types of reasoning to develop. 
3. Expansion capability to explore alternatives outside of the fixation effect 
using expansive reasoning. Indeed, resisting fixation is not enough to explore 
alternative solutions, as expansive reasoning remains to be conducted to 
investigate new creative possibilities. It is possible to develop expansive 
heuristics and to further support expansion capabilities, and it is likely that 
design school’s curricula help to foster such generative heuristics.   
We hypothesise that these three capabilities develop in parallel and at different 
paces. A modelling and simulation approach building on the development of 
these three mechanisms may provide great insights on the multi-folded nature of 
fixation in creative design. Further research should investigate this matter. 
Moreover, theoretical and experimental work on fixation in groups would 
greatly enrich the perspectives exposed in this paper.  
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